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ABSTRACT

This presentation comprises an account of the years from 1966 to 1970 during which a proposal to construct four educational parks or compus schools to accommodate all elementary school (K-6) children was made, discussed, researched, publicized, and ultimately defeated. As defined in the literature, educational parks are clusterings of educational facilities in campus-like settings--centrally-organized common facilities serving the schools on the campuses are added essential ingredients. The Syracuse Campus Plan originated out of perceived needs for the 31 elementary schools--to renew the school plants; to speed the integration of black and white children; and to reorient the curriculum to take advantage of recent thinking, experience, and technological advance in the field of elementary education. This case study presents the history in chronological order, identifies the participants and their ideologies, and concludes with an analysis of the decisionmaking process that resulted in the defeat of this innovative measure. (Author/MLF)

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HOW THE CAMPUS PROPOSAL FAILED IN SYRACUSE, NEW YORK

By

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June 1970

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G. S. B.
May, 1970

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HOW THE CAMPUS PROPOSAL FAILED IN SYRACUSE, NEW YORK

This is an account of the years from 1966 to 1970 in which the people of Syracuse, New York, talked of building an educational park or "Campus Plan." The Syracuse experience represents a microcosm of urban education in the United States. During those years the education problems seemed critical. They were problems of how to teach and what to teach, shortages of money and of trained manpower, the breakdown of old patterns of authority, racial conflict, and other crises. It is important to note that few people perceived an acute crisis in Syracuse schools. Indeed, backers of the Campus Plan argued that it was a means of coping with some of the difficulties in their early stages. Whatever the merits of their claim, the tragedy may be that Syracuse will get action on the perceived issues only after a first-order crisis produces motivation that has hitherto been lacking.

An educational park has been defined as a "...clustering of educational facilities in a campus-like setting...Centrally-organized common facilities serving the schools on the campus are the added essential ingredient..." It has been suggested that elementary and secondary facilities for an entire community or section

of a city should be so centralized.[1] A number of variations on this theme have been worked out. In Syracuse, the Campus Plan concerned only the elementary grades, kindergarten through six.

When educational parks were first strongly urged, in the early sixties, they were viewed as a device to further integration of the races, to provide a better quality of education in urban schools, and even to help stem the tide of migration to the suburbs.[2] Each of these arguments was used in the Syracuse case, as they have been in an estimated 80 other places where educational parks have been seriously proposed during the past five years. In many localities the idea has met strong opposition.

When the Campus Plan was suggested for Syracuse in the winter of 1965-1966 the city was the center of a growing, three-county metropolitan area of about 613,000 people. The city of Syracuse itself reached its peak population in the early 1950s at about 220,000, declined to 216,000 by 1960, and was still slowly shrinking during the sixties. For whatever reasons, people were moving to the suburbs. Meanwhile the black population of the city began to grow with an in-migration of Southerners after 1950. The black population was estimated roughly as comprising 10 per cent of the total in 1969, say

20,000 people. The white population includes many "hyphenated Americans" of the first or second generation. In the 1960s, Irish, Italian, German, Polish, and other ethnic neighborhoods were still identifiable, as were black neighborhoods.

Located at the intersection of several major transportation arteries, the Syracuse metropolitan area has continued to grow. Diversified manufacturing industries, wholesaling, and retailing are the base of the local economy. Although many national firms have local plants, no one firm is dominant. Businessmen ordinarily address public issues through the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers' Association, or the Metropolitan Development Association. And although most of the big unions have local affiliates, no one is paramount nor do unions play a very prominent part in local affairs.

Syracuse has a strong mayor-council government, with the Common Council consisting of a President, four at-large, and five district councilmen. Before the year 1970 there had been only one Democratic mayor and no Democratic majority on the Common Council since the 1920s. Republican even in the 1936 Presidential election, Syracuse nonetheless has been witnessing a slow strengthening of its Democratic vote as the composition of its population has shifted. In recent years, the Common Council

has consistently had a Democratic member or two.

The seven members of the Board of Education are elected on the same partisan tickets as other elective city officials. The Board also has been heavily Republican for many years, with a Democrat or two on hand recently, as with the Common Council. Although state law gives the Board and District considerable independence, by that same law the District is in effect a department of Syracuse government. Its budget is approved by the Mayor, the Board of Estimate, and the Common Council in a manner similar to other city departmental budgets. The Mayor fills vacancies on the Board of Education, between elections, and he sometimes consults with it. Primarily he acts on educational matters through the budget. No doubt he and other officials, including party leaders, cope with educational questions behind the scenes, discreetly. Except at elections, however, parties usually claim to keep hands off the school. Through that delicious conceit so common in American localities, what is by law partisan is not infrequently declared non-partisan.

The Superintendent is appointed by the Board of Education to manage the staff and all its enterprises. And in this case, the Superintendent is the protagonist. Franklyn S. Barry, a Doctor of Education from Syracuse

University, served as head of three large school districts before he assumed the Syracuse superintendency in 1963. He is a jovial but forceful man, recognized as a capable and knowledgeable leader in Syracuse, across New York, and in other parts of the United States. Without him, the morality play of the Campus Plan probably would not have been acted out.

The Superintendent's staff in these years comprised four assistant superintendents and over 50 other professionals. Two assistant superintendents were integral to the Campus Plan decisions. Executive Assistant Superintendent Edwin E. Weeks, Jr., served as the fiscal expert for the District and carried out liaison with the city's fiscal offices. He was considered and considered himself the businessman in headquarters, and he had a reputation for conservatism on fiscal matters. Hanford A. Salmon, Assistant Superintendent for Personnel, worked with Superintendent Barry in the large North Syracuse suburban district before they came to Syracuse. Salmon was heavily occupied in the Campus Plan years with all the questions raised by the new militancy of teachers and teachers' organizations.

The superintendent's responsibilities epitomize the deep complexity of the urban education enterprise. As does any top manager, he scrambles to draft and

enforce a budget, to retain qualified teachers, and to keep up the buildings. The late sixties in Syracuse were complicated by increasing property tax rates and sales taxes, by new consciousness of racial inequities in the schools, by mounting disciplinary questions apart from race, by stronger teachers' groups vying for pay and rights, and more. Even in a big district, individual student and teacher problems face headquarters daily. Wrathful parents must see the superintendent. Teachers must be disciplined.

The Campus Plan effort rarely assumed primacy in the District Offices--a distinguished consultant said that it was always a second job for any staff member.

THE PLAN IS BORN

The Syracuse Campus Plan originated in the conjunction of three streams of perceived needs for the 31 elementary schools: (1) for renewing the school plant, (2) for speeding the integration of black and white children, and (3) for re-orienting the curriculum. In retrospect, many observers feel that the racial integration need was dominant. As the discussion proceeded, however, no single need prevailed in public discussion. It may have been a classic case of an entire community submerging its feelings about the "real issue." If

racial integration was the focus of the Campus Plan debate, the professionals, officials, and the public for the most part concealed it well.

In 1966 eight elementary school buildings were over 50 years of age and 27 were 36 years or older. The newest building was erected in 1957, although five had been remodelled or augmented since that date. This situation resulted in part from a 1959 long-range plan by the District,[3] laying the basis for a major building program for senior and junior high schools. Its recommendations for new elementary buildings and for conversion of secondary buildings to use as elementary centers were not fully implemented by 1966. The 1959 document called for a departure from pay-as-you-go financing, a policy the City had more or less successfully implemented since the late 1930s. Some bonds were sold to finance high schools. But the accumulation of vintage schools and other ramshackle plants caused little public uproar through the Campus Plan period. The Board of Education was performing routine functions when it looked to a revamping of elementary schools as its next capital venture. The Superintendent and staff provided the Campus Plan as their response to the situation.

Racial imbalance had been debated in Syracuse since the early 1960s as in many large cities.[4] A costly compensatory education program was tried in two of the three

predominantly black schools from 1962-66, but it was then abandoned. In 1963, the Board of Education declared racial balance a major goal in the system, after State Education Commissioner James E. Allen ordered all New York schools to report on racial imbalance and plans to eradicate it. Two schools were closed and a modest busing effort was begun. In 1966, the busing was stepped up to include 900 children, mostly Negroes; two more inner city schools were shut down. Despite these and other programs, the quality of education in inner city schools[5] and a continuing racial imbalance plagued the city.

In 1966 there were 13,440 children in kindergarten through the sixth grade, a figure a little higher than that in 1960.[6] Of these 3,806 or 20.6 per cent were Negro. This percentage is to be compared with the approximately 10 per cent of blacks in the total city population. By its own yardstick, the Board found that 24 of the District's elementary schools were racially imbalanced.[7] By 1966 Superintendent Barry and members of his staff were underlining these points in their public statements. Board members were not so vocal, although President David H. Jaquith and others had gradually begun to speak out.[8] The Board's experiences with inner city schools since 1962 had impressed on them the troublesome nature of the growing imbalance. The local political

leadership, the news media, or the public generally did not seem to be concerned or aroused on this point. But Dr. Barry, his staff and Board members came to see the Campus Plan as a strategic response to racial imbalance.

The third stream of concern leading to the Campus Plan was isolated within the District staff and a small number of professional educators in the locality. This was the perceived need to take advantage of recent thinking, experience, and technological advance in the field of elementary education. The District staff, including Dr. Barry, believed that "modern educational requirements" were not being met in elementary schools. They stated that, "The educational system has the responsibility for preparing our children to cope with the new problems"--the impact of technology, new ways of acquiring information, new work and new rigors of living. Current educational facilities and instructional techniques, audio-visual aids, computer assistance better-trained staff, all could be combined in a campus at lower cost than in individual schools, it was argued.[9] Their point of view was not fully spelled out until the second year of the campaign on the Campus Plan, in the Green Report. There is little evidence that teachers, public officials, news media, or indeed many persons at all ever understood or were convinced by this reasoning.

These needs for Syracuse schools, as seen by the professionals and the Board who formulated, studied, and worked for the Campus Plan from 1966-70, are elaborated in the three main reports of 1967 and 1968. Superintendent Barry probably first advanced the specific campus idea as a package to meet the perceived needs. But the idea was developed in the research division under Mr. David F. Sine's direction. Other staff and Board members joined, and the Campus Plan became an official project for the District. Nonetheless, there was never unanimity in the staff or Board about the Plan. They disagreed often behind the scenes, but they did not allow any disagreement save that by two commissioners to become public knowledge.

The First Year

The educational park idea was first raised in staff and board meetings in the fall of 1965. Dr. Barry recalls that Board members Kenneth Gale and Edith Romano were enthusiasts for it and that Mr. Jaquith soon became convinced of its worth. Dr. Barry sought advice from several outside agencies, and in successive, short staff reports a general position in favor of concentrating elementary pupils in fewer schools evolved during February and March of 1966.[10]

On March 15, Superintendent Barry and Mayor William

Walsh jointly announced to the press a long-range proposal to construct four campus schools to accommodate all elementary school (K-6) children. The first such campus was tentatively located on the city's southeast side, near Meadowbrook Drive. Barry immediately began to seek support for the plan. He spoke before the Metropolitan Development Association and consulted with, among other people, the President of the Manufacturers Association and the Syracuse Bureau of Governmental Research. His efforts were discreet and low-key.

In May, the Board of Education voted to study the building proposal and to advance funds to finance it. Through regular channels they received permission from the City's main fiscal body, the Board of Estimate, to use $10,000 in surplus state aid funds. The School Board also approved the establishment of a Campus Site Planning Center, outside the facilities of the City School District, and appointment of a staff project director. Along these lines, Barry indicated that when the time came he would recommend Mr. Sine, Staff Director of Research, to be director of the Campus Site Plan Study. This meant that the three people on the research staff would perform the study. One other fulltime employee was appointed for this purpose, although funds for more staff were available throughout the planning period to 1969.

The researchers were asked for a plan that would operate at the same per-pupil cost as did the elementary schools then operating. The study was to be completed no later than March of 1967, and was to be voted on by the Board at that time. Barry also announced that the feasibility study, as it came to be known, would be carried out objectively and with community involvement. The Board deferred any expenditures for new elementary school construction until the study was completed.[11]

Arrangements proceeded with great deliberation. In August, David H. Jaquith, Board of Education President, announced the appointment of a Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC). The CAC's purpose was to ask questions and not to make specific recommendations. Its chairman was John A. Kane, Jr., former president of the Board of Education. Among the eleven members were another former Board president, the city finance commissioner, majority leader of the Common Council, a lawyer, a manufacturer, a labor official, a doctor, and five housewives, two of whom were Negro. Every name on the list was well known among civic organizations with the possible exception of George C. Shattuck, an attorney in one of the City's major law firms. He was appointed to the CAC because he had raised questions about the Campus idea as early as April 1966, in a letter sent to Dr. Barry. Shattuck was

spokesman for an ad hoc organization, the Council for Better Education, which wrote to the Board on April 18 opposing the Campus idea and urging that racial segregation be ended "through natural compatibility and not forced proximity."

Through the fall, when the study was already well under way, Dr. Barry found outside funds to support it. In September, the local Rosamond Gifford Charitable Corporation, gave the School District $23,000. A trustee of the organization, Mrs. John H. Lynch, said, "The trustees of the Gifford Foundation are pleased to be able to assist in financing one of the most important studies ever to be undertaken by the city school district. The development of the campus site concept may provide many of the answers to offering superior educational facilities and programs for all children.[12] This statement reflected accurately the enthusiasm of the relatively few public comments about the Campus study in that period.

In October the U.S. Office of Education approved a $47,000 grant for the study, and in December the Educational Facilities Laboratory of the Ford Foundation, contributed $30,000. This brought the total to $110,000. In addition, much work in the form of personal services was never costed--from faculty at Syracuse University,

Cortland and Oswego State Colleges, and several departments of the City government.

Research Director Sine managed the study quietly, with little help from the Superintendent or District staff outside his office. He had assistance from six different consulting firms in the fields of economics, education, transportation and architecture. There were at least five individual outside consultants. But there was very little publicity. In November, the evening paper, The Herald Journal, suggested that some insiders, including Jaquith and Kane, thought the study was lagging but that Sine believed it would be completed on schedule.[13] The cost constraints given to Sine probably were a principal cause of delays.

In late December the Board devoted one of its private "study sessions" to the Campus site study. Sine and his assistant director, Lawrence Marquit, described their progress and the locations considered for the campuses. Sine asked for a brochure to be published in January describing the background and purposes of the Plan. The Board cautioned him to be specific in his final recommendations.

Delays continued and in January the Board also delayed further talk of integration measures until the Plan

was completed. Controversy began among those immediately concerned with the report. Mr. Shattuck slowly became identified as the most persistent questioner, and he was active in the few Advisory Committee meetings as well as in conversations with Sine and Board members. A month after a first draft report was completed, Shattuck circulated his own 40-page report to the Board.[14] He raised doubts about the quality of education at a campus, availability of trained teachers, costs, and acceptability of the Plan to parents. He made a strong case for neighborhood schools rather than the Campus Plan, which he felt was not adequately analyzed in the draft report.

Mild public controversy arose when the Herald-Journal editorial expressed hope that the proposal would be open to change. City Parks and Recreation Commissioner, James Heath, during remarks at a University-sponsored round table, asked for a referendum on the Campus Plan. In reply, Superintendent Barry opposed a referendum as undesirable. That question however was to linger a long while.

Thus a somewhat uncertain stage was set for release of the study on July 18, 1967, 14 months after the Superintendent and Mayor had publicly advocated it. It was a detailed report containing 227 pages of text, notes, plans and tables--a scheme for combining all the students from eight of the oldest elementary schools and

selected students from seven other schools on one campus on the southeast side of the city.[15] The physical facilities, the educational program, the technology and the fiscal implications were spelled out generally. The plan was not so detailed as to be ready for immediate implementation. The next stage would have to be working plans for buildings, program, and financing.

The report analyzed Syracuse's population projected to 1975. It considered the gamut of problems of public education at the elementary level in Syracuse. After proposing a campus site and program, it examined the various possible locations, transportation arrangements, physical facilities, and staffing costs. Finally, a capital program for the new elementary school was outlined.

The Campus Plan was explicitly advanced in answer to the aging elementary school structures, to the professed need for reform in program at the elementary level, and to the present racial imbalance. The 4270-pupil school, to be built at a cost of $10,088,000, was claimed to be a saving of $3,660,000 over the cost of replacing eight or nine neighborhood schools to accommodate the same number of students. When debt service was included in the estimates, the report listed $14,141,775 as the Campus Plan cost, and

$14,765,434 as the cost of replacement of neighborhood schools.[16]

Another Year's Delay

Reminiscing in 1969, one key staff member said, "We should have gone ahead and built it then. But somebody said let's study it." In retrospect, it appears that strong leadership by the Superintendent or the Board Chairman in 1967 might have brought a decision to build with little further ado. But that was not to be: There were reasons to waver. In an editorial the Herald-Journal praised the school system for moving ahead cautiously in accord with citizen opinion. Although it raised questions about the amount of busing in the Plan, the Herald-Journal endorsed it. Shattuck had, however, made some impact on the Board. After all, four Board positions were up for election in the fall. The Board did not act on the Plan. The moment passed.

The Campus Plan was only one of a number of issues raised in the rather desultory School Board election campaign that fall of 1967. The morning Post-Standard thought most nominees were dodging the issue. Mr. Jaquith held the Plan was not a fully developed proposal, but Norman Pinsky and one or two others spoke favorably of it. George Shattuck, now a candidate for the Board, virtually based his entire campaign on opposition to it.

Indeed Shattuck had risen to candidacy on that basis. He sharpened his arguments before parent groups and other organizations and in two written analyses. He struck at the costs of four campuses, at the location of the first campus on the south side when most students were to come from the north side, and at what he considered the generally faulty reasoning of the July, 1967, report. Shattuck's reputation so far as the press was concerned became that of the only person outside the District staff who had really researched the Plan.

The political parties in Syracuse nominate tickets for Education Commissioner, but there was no endorsement or refutation of the Campus issue by the parties in 1967 or indeed at any time since. Jaquith, Shattuck, and Pinsky were elected from four names on the Republican slate. One of four Democrats, Armand J. Magnarelli, was elected. Two previous members of the Board, including the only Black, lost out by slim margins. Significantly, the Conservative Party had endorsed all of the winners except Pinsky. The fourth Conservative nominee ran only on that ticket--far below the others. In a sense, this represented a victory for the swing voters of the Conservative Party. One identifies no direct mandate about the Campus Plan, but the Conservative vote was understood to be a blow struck for less taxes and less spending. Shattuck got the biggest vote and

took a vantage point (See Table I) on the Board where Magnarelli and he began opposing the Campus Plan.

Through the fall, therefore, the Campus Plan remained on the back burner. Sine's own efforts slacked off, and Barry found no time to push on. The failure to get a strong positive response to the feasibility report seems to have caught them unprepared or uncertain as to next steps. Dr. Barry was somewhat reassured in late November when Mayor Walsh affirmed his support of the Campus Plan before the U.S. Conference of Mayors, although the Mayor spoke of difficulties in financing it. Barry seems to have been looking for ideas, but he was unsuccessful in soliciting funds for further study from the U.S. Office of Education. Now, as throughout the 1967-1969 period, he worked alone most of the time.

Barry, however, made an overt move to quiet one point of criticism that Shattuck and others had been emphasizing. He mentioned publicly a possible change in the first campus site to the north side of Syracuse, where the eight schools to be closed were located. The original south side site had been readily obtainable from one owner. Its choice was also based on a hope of getting 90 per cent of busing costs from state aid. Most children would have ridden over 1.5 miles in such

TABLE I

1967

Syracuse Election

Commissioner of Education

(Regular election for four)

Candidate	Rep.	Dem.	Conservative	Liberal	Total
Shattuck, George	34,260		3,852		38,112
Jaquith, David	34,007		3,863		37,870
Magnarelli, Armand	27,154		3,544		30,698
Pinsky, Norman	30,295				30,295
Warr, Robert		28,881		1,223	30,104
VanDusen, Ellen	29,606				29,606
Mangin, William		24,525		1,009	25,534
DeRosa, Alfred		23,331			23,331
Zona, Rudolph			4,095		4,095
Williams, Anna Mae				1,707	1,707

Source: Onondaga County Board of Elections

a plan and that was the crucial breaking point in the aid formula. This shift in plans was the first of several tactical moves over the next year, aimed at allaying criticism from foes of the Plan.

The Green Report

At this point Barry turned for help to the new,

federally-financed Eastern Regional Institute for Education (ERIE).[17] In late 1967, he held first conversations with ERIE leaders, and in January, 1968 asked them for help in preparing a new report on the Campus Plan by about April 1. ERIE responded by assigning Dr. Allan Hartman, a senior staffer, to work with Dr. Barry's Director of Curriculum Services, R. A. Zieschang. A conference of about 40 educators (virtually all District personnel) was held in late February to relate new ideas in the field to the Campus Plan. By May 1, Hartman and Zieschang had for the Board and public a sophisticated run-down on the program to be mounted on a campus.[18]

Its major concern was to "describe some of the more significant aspects and characteristics of a quality educational program...an individualized learning program and its implications for staffing.[19] The report assumed that development of a major educational program should involve both school and community; that the people of Syracuse subscribed to specified goals of "quality education;" and that individualized learning and a relevant curriculum could help produce such quality education. Then this "Green Report" summarized some major implications of the assumptions. Community involvement and goals were covered in ten pages, emphasizing individual development and understanding of self and heritage.

The bulk of this second report was devoted to a discussion of the meaning of individualized learning and of the resources that recent research and testing in education afforded for pursuing it. The parts of a "relevant curriculum" were reviewed and their implications were drawn out in terms of staffing, organization, resources and facilities. The need for further work, to take an estimated three years before the program could be placed in operation, was underlined. In sum, the report was termed a "synthesis of the best hopes, ideas, and thoughts of many dedicated local school personnel" as to the program needed at the elementary level in the City.[20]

The Green Report, like the earlier Orange Report and the subsequent White Report that appeared in the fall of 1968, did not receive wide distribution. It was not a public relations piece in the usual sense because of its limited circulation and its professional tone. It did answer the argument Shattuck and others had made, that the 1967 Orange Report said little about the educational program for the new campus.

Barry wanted to put specific proposals to the Board before the summer of 1968. When President Jaquith spoke of hearings, Commissioner Shattuck objected to having them in the summer vacation period. Jaquith yielded.

Shattuck's barrage continued, however. He circulated to the Board and a few selected people in the City yet another of his tracts in flat refutation of the Plan. He especially hit the cost aspects and the lack of any information on educational programs. This was a short (seven and one-half page) piece, as Shattuck's usually were. It was hard hitting, contained a minimum of figures, and mentioned only briefly any alternatives to the Campus Plan. Its effectiveness cannot be measured. Many changes made by district staff now and later in the original plan seem to have been in response to Shattuck's cross-examination. Board study sessions, private caucuses in reality, were the scene of brief debates with Shattuck. Said one official, "I don't understand the man. You answer one question and immediately he has two more!"[21]

During April there was optimism in staff and Board that the Board would finally act on the Plan in May. A proposal for a $250,000 grant was made to the U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare. These funds were to be used for further staff work on the Plan. The Board, to meet Departmental requirements, voted over Shattuck's opposition that they would decide on the Campus Plan by January 15, 1969. The grant subsequently was made. It was at this point that the Green

Report appeared, in effect depriving Commissioner Shattuck of one of his debating points. But there was to be only delaying action by the Board once again. Board members were not fully convinced. They determined to look further at fiscal aspects of the Plan and Shattuck again seems to have been responsible for this decision. Through ERIE and using principally ERIE funds (a special grant from the U.S. Office of Education), the services of Dr. Maurice Osborne, fiscal analyst and retired State Assistant Commissioner for Educational Finance and Management Services, were acquired.

Mr. Shattuck now secured an ally in the Herald-Journal which decried the procrastination and hailed Shattuck's call to replace the worst elementary schools at once. This marks an important watershed in press attitudes. Before this juncture, the Syracuse newspapers mildly pressed for plans in general as expressed in staff documents. Henceforward, the press was more negative in tone and regularly took issue with views of the majority of the Board and the Superintendent.

The Osborne study continued through the summer with a completion date set at October first. ERIE supplied the equivalent of three full-time persons to assist Osborne--its staff support for the study never relaxed after work began on the Green Report. Osborne also employed four outside, short-term experts on construction,

transportation, and finances.

New complications now arose. In July, Board President David Jaquith, a Campus Plan advocate, announced plans to move to the suburbs. This meant he would resign his position as Commissioner of Education. Although he offered to resign immediately, the Mayor asked him to remain on the Board until he actually moved in January. Jaquith was a member of the Conservative Party, but he nevertheless supported the Campus Plan and wanted increased state aid to education in urban areas.

The Post-Standard responded to the announcement of Jaquith's resignation with praise for the man and regret for the timing in relation to the controversial Campus Plan. The editorial alluded to criticism of the Plan from both within and outside the Board of Education. It hoped Jaquith would be around when the Plan's revisions were presented so he could make his views known to the public which had great faith in him.

In addition, a new, loud voice in the late summer commenced attacking Plan and Board. Alfred C. DeRosa attended successive Board meetings and spoke for a referendum on the plan. DeRosa, an accountant, at one meeting was supported by Democratic Common Councilman R. A. Grudzinski and Robert Sgroi, counsel to the Democratic minority on the Council. In his bitter clashes with

the Board, DeRosa seemed at times to speak for the Italian-American residents on the City's north side, although he represented no organization. It was commonly held, also, that his two colleagues with Polish names represented widely-held views among the west side Polish minority who were concentrated in Grudzinski's ward. DeRosa probably characterized opinions of a number of ethnics throughout the City.[22]

At the October 15 Board meeting, DeRosa announced the formation of a Bond Information Committee, committed to a referendum. Martin Feldman, president of the Syracuse Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, affirmed Derosa's stand, saying to the Board: "If you refuse the people the right of the ballot box, you are in reality saying...that you firmly believe that the voters will vote negatively."[23] The Syracuse Federation of Teachers represented less than one-fourth of the City's teachers and was not the bargaining agent for them under state law.

Mr. DeRosa eventually was so outspoken that the Board Chairman informed him he would no longer recognize him to speak at meetings. Shortly thereafter, DeRosa was quoted as disbanding his BIC--its goal was accomplished, he said, when Republican Council members in November declared for a referendum.

The White Report

October 9, 1969, 31 months after Barry and Walsh had announced the Campus Plan, a third major report was released by the Board.[24] This "White Report" was a complete description and projection of the fiscal aspects of the Campus Plan.[25] Primarily, it looked at the first of the four facilities proposed, but a final section gave tentative estimates on the last three campuses. The report, in workmanlike fashion, placed the fiscal side of the Plan within the context of Syracuse City finances, and State aid possibilities. Chances for federal and for foundation aid were not assessed, however. Both operating and capital costs were detailed. The proposed borrowing now was indicated as $14.9 million for the first campus. The increase from earlier estimates was attributable to increases in school building costs from $18 to $24 per square foot since publication of the Orange Report, and to a much closer examination of the TV, audio-visual, and computer equipment that might be included. Of the total, $9.8 million would go to building construction. Thus, the total capital cost including debt service for a 15 year term at an estimated 4 per cent interest amounted to $19,658,000. It was noted that any property taxes assessed to meet such costs did not come under the constitutional limitations on such taxes. Further, it was

estimated that state aid would cover about 52.4 per cent of annual debt service. Although the constitutional debt limit for the City at that point was over $87 million, current outstanding bonded indebtedness was only $29.85 million.

Operating costs added by the new school were to be more troublesome. Personnel costs would be up a million dollars per year above those for the schools replaced. Audio-visual and computer maintenance costs would add perhaps $50,000 per year to the first campus. These must be met from current revenues of the City. The main source of such revenue, the general property tax, was in that year running at 1.974 per cent of average full valuation of real property--almost the 2 per cent limit set by the State Constitution. Dr. Osborne looked at several different schemes for financing each of the elements, with the exception of staffing and audio-visual equipment for which no alternatives were apparent. He concluded that the most realistic solution was for the City to raise additional revenues from one of the other sources then available to it by law.

A brochure summarizing the three major reports was prepared for wider dissemination during November.[26] It pinpointed capital costs and compared them with costs of

building five new, separate schools with most facilities similar to those in the Campus Plan. The separate schools would cost $1.4 million more than the Plan itself. Operating costs were admittedly higher for the first campus than for the scattered-site schools. Finally, it was pointed out that state aid would amount to about $4.7 million for capital costs, and further assistance from Washington and foundations was probable. It was estimated the average taxpayer would have about $12 added to his tax bill under the new plan, compared with $8 if no new individualized programs were put into new, separate schools.

October, 1968--a wealth of data on all aspects of the Plan was available. For the third time in two and one half years the decks were cleared for action. News media were devoting more space than ever to the debate. People and groups were choosing sides. Proponents of the Plan, led by the Superintendent, began for the first time to speak of mobilizing a coalition of forces behind their Plan. It seemed pretty late in the game.

THE CLIMAX

Up to the fall of 1968, Superintendent Barry was prime mover for the Plan. He delegated study leadership to Sine for the first report, to Zieschang and ERIE for the second, and to Osborne and ERIE for the third. But

Barry carried the ball for the Plan in Board meetings and in the public arena. He announced in the summer of 1968 that Assistant Superintendent Hanford A. Salmon was to provide leadership after September 1. Salmon then turned some of his attention to the Plan, even though he was not relieved of his other duties. Dr. Barry, however, never succeeded in delegating much of the job. The large federal grant placed ample funds at his disposal to hire one or more outsiders to head the operation, but he never used them.[27]

In other cities the president or members of the Board of Education often take up the cudgel for an innovative move originated by superintendent or staff. This did not occur in Syracuse. For one thing, President Jaquith, a wealthy manufacturer, was constantly out of the City on business. For another, Jaquith had announced he would resign from the Board at the end of the year. This impending change undoubtedly muted his voice, even though he made frequent statements that placed him among known supporters. He made no move at any point to lead, but he did generally speak for the Plan.

It was fairly well known by late October, in and out of the press, that Boare members favored the Plan by a good margin. Of the seven, only Shattuck and Magnarelli were clearly anti-Plan. Against this background, three

months of more intense public interest prevailed, through the Christmas season into late January. The period was marked by the first genuine attempt to marshal public support behind the Campus--a largely abortive effort. Secondly, this was a time of reaction by opponents of the Plan that, as public agitation had gone in Syracuse through the years, cannot be called more than moderate. What was different was the big increase in debate on the Plan. It was the talk-of-the-town; press stories appeared almost daily, and cautious and not-so-cautious positions were taken by a number of groups.

The Campus Plan Public Information Advisory Committee

Superintendent Barry took the lead in organizing a public information campaign. On October 16, he asked the Board to set up a committee of citizens to tell Syracuse about the Plan. Over the opposition of Shattuck and Magnarelli the Board consented and members of the Campus Plan Public Information Advisory Committee (CPPIAC) were selected during the next three weeks by Barry and Jaquith in consultation with other Board members. Seventeen were selected, although several joined only after the first and second meetings. The Chairman was Mrs. Stephen K. Bailey, active in several community organizations and wife of a member of the New York State Board of Regents, governing body of all state educational institutions. Among the members were at least three prominent

personages: Monsignor Thomas H. Costello, Superintendent of Catholic Schools; Alexander E. Holstein, Jr., manufacturer and member of three of the major business organizations; and John Searles, Executive Vice President of the Metropolitan Development Association, the most active and putatively most powerful businessmen's group in central New York. There was a well-known Presbyterian minister; a Republican city councilman; two representatives of individual school parent groups; a past president of the Council of Independent Parent Organizations; a past president of the Council of PTA's; an elementary teacher; two prominent officials of Negro organizations; the president of the North Side Businessmen's Organization, known as heavily Italian-American in orientation; and two persons who volunteered to become members. Nine of the CPPIAC were known during its brief life as pro-campus and four never made their views clear. Finally, five left no doubt of their opposition, among them the Republican councilman, the North Side Businessman, and the two volunteers.

This CPPIAC plainly was not "stacked" toward any viewpoint, and plainly it did represent many segments of the populace. The political parties were not represented as such, but neither were many other constituencies. Neither Board members nor Barry met with the CPPIAC after

its first meeting although several District staff did, along with employees of ERIE and Barlow-Johnson (a public relations firm). The CPPIAC met five times at weekly intervals before it disbanded.

Its ongoing agenda comprised three questions: 1) Was the Committee to disseminate information or only to recommend? 2) What information was to be disseminated? 3) By what means was the public to be informed? From the first, discussions were heated. The first question was only settled at the fourth meeting by a memorandum from the Superintendent:

> The Committee makes its recommendations to the staff, which implements them. It is not necessary for the Board to approve our recommendations, though they should be kept informed.[28]

The bulk of the five meetings concerned the second and third questions. The clearly "anti" members worried that the CPPIAC would be solely a voice supporting the Plan and argued for stronger expression of criticisms. The majority favored issuing pro and con materials but worried about keeping expressions of dissent to the point and in-bounds. They indicated there was a greater amount of professional research for proponents to use as contrasted with the dearth of facts or studies in opposition. Nevertheless, they quickly established several information media. The CPPIAC set up a telephone service

to receive and answer questions, got a post-office box for mailed questions, posted a summary statement about the Plan to 300 local organizations, approved a slide and sound presentation of the Plan for use at public meetings, and moved to create a speakers bureau.

The CPPIAC talked of the School Board's plan to hire a local PR firm to act as its staff. A minor storm over this $20,000 proposal blew up in the papers, and at the November 20 Board meeting.[29] Opponents, such as Commissioner Magnarelli, argued it was just a way to sell the Plan. The Herald-Journal expressed high indignation that the PR firm was going to "sell" the plan--and suddenly to the editors $20,000 seemed a monstrous sum. The Board rode out the storm by delaying approval until December 11.

At the Committee's fifth meeting, a bare quorum discussed whether it had fulfilled its mandate. By a 5-4 vote it was decided they had, and so they disbanded. Demise of the CPPIAC meant there was no specially designated leadership for the Campus idea outside the regular ranks of District staff and Board. Formation of a citizen's group to push the Plan was announced, but the group never became very active. The Superintendent was left to continue the job with little help.

Referendum?

In a separate development, attention centered on the referendum idea in late October as CPPIAC was organized. Five Republican county legislators, all of Polish and Italian extraction and from districts on the north and west sides, told the news media on October 24 there should be a public vote on the Campus Plan.[30] Three days later, the six Republican members of the Common Council announced the same position. Neither the Chairman of the Party nor any of its committees ever took a public position on the Plan. The Chairman, a suburban resident, was however, known to have argued against the Plan in private and to have given his views via telephone to various people, including at least one School Board member. It would be erroneous to suggest the Party apparatus actively worked against the Campus, but the political affiliations of the legislators and councilmen were apparent to all. One of the two Democrats on the Council, Grudzinski, had long since spoken for a referendum and was strong in opposition to the Plan by November. The other councilman, Lee Alexander, took a public position in favor of a greatly modified Plan only after he became Democratic candidate for mayor, in 1970.

Superintendent Barry went at once to the Syracuse Corporation Counsel who wrote back a lengthy opinion on

the referendum. The City charter and the law were plain enough that, once the Campus Plan was recommended by the Board to the Council, the Council could vote the requisite funds including the bonds. No referendum was required, nor could the Council avoid or defeat the Plan and then submit it to a public vote. The sole way to have a referendum was for the Council to vote for the Plan by a two-thirds majority and then put it on the ballot at a special or general election.

When this word appeared, many people including Republican Councilmen, indulged in private and public head-scratching. The majority leader insisted they would still call a referendum, but how could they vote for the Plan to get to the referendum stage and then explain to the public they really were not in favor of it? The question hung fire into 1969, and it was an uncertain factor in the Board of Education's January decision on the Plan. The Common Council simply did not want the Plan passed to them by the Board. The two newspapers later found several occasions to voice approval for the referendum.

Alternative Plans

Both of the opponents of the Campus Plan on the Board of Education offered brief alternative plans to the public during November and December.[31] Commissioners

Shattuck and Magnarelli were not associated in making these proposals, nor did they claim a relationship in educational matters on any other occasion. The "plans" they offered were brief and undocumented and seem to have been prepared with little outside help. Mr. Shattuck offered the "community school concept" as a "basic policy for future school planning..." He defined this as the use of neighborhood schools for the "whole community." He emphasized the neighborhood aspect and the need to permit "free transfer among schools" according to the "preference of parents." Flexibility of design and use was the keynote of the community school. He had about 900 students or less in mind. He offered his plan to help urban residential areas in place of the "financially irresponsible" Campus Plan.

Mr. Magnarelli released a plan to the papers on November 12 and discussed it with the Board of Education. He said he drew heavily on a study prepared for Buffalo by the Center for Urban Education, New York City.[32] His idea was to replace the outmoded neighborhood schools with new buildings sufficiently large to permit voluntary transfer of students. Believing that the Campus Plan would not bring racial balance to the schools, he stated that "to have complete integration in our schools, there would first have to be a change in attitude in the community."

Magnarelli asked for a 4-4-4 plan for the city schools that would employ neighborhood schools for pre-kindergarten, kindergarten, and the first four grades. The educational park concept would then be applied at the fifth through eighth grades and the secondary level. He felt this would allay criticism by parents who did not want small children to go to large schools on buses. He wanted television to be used but questioned the educational value of computers.

In the dying days of the controversy, before the final vote by the Board, the Herald-Journal in an editorial proposed its alternative: a "grade school center for about 1,500 children (kindergarten through sixth grade)." "Let's be realistic," the paper urged, and take a middle way. This kind of complex would scale down the costs and meet criticisms by the parents who are "horrified and rightly so at concentrating 4,500 children in one location on the edge of the city."

This was a time for bargaining. The Herald-Journal liked its plan. Magnarelli and Shattuck outlined and argued their plans at parent organizations about the City. The School Board spent a little time at their meetings in discussing them. Doubtless, there was discussion and comment off the record within the District staff--discussion but not great debate. The bargaining

process was not conducted face-to-face but was indirect and was to consume many more months of time.

Dr. Barry seems to have attempted to react to public criticism, during the fall and winter of 1968-1969. He checked his judgement in public sessions and with his staff, in a more or less conscious attempt to re-think the original Campus Plan to bring it into line with sentiment in Syracuse. An attempt at compromise was revealed by Assistant Superintendent Hanford A. Salmon at a CPIC meeting November 27. He spoke of keeping neighborhood features in the satellite schools of the campus. Each such satellite would comprise students from a single neighborhood plus others from a second neighborhood to achieve racial balance. This was an adjustment to meet the general neighborhood argument, based upon staff work at ERIE. It caused no especially great comment or noticeable change in opposition sentiments.

The North Side

The Orange Report spotted the first campus near the northern city limits, and at first seven, then eight schools nearby were to be closed. On the north side, therefore, much of the "grassroots" action occurred during the height of the controversy, the winter of 1968-1969. Mothers' clubs in the elementary schools were the heart of opposition to the Plan on the north side, although the

Northside Businessmen's Association voted against the Plan at a meeting. This largely Italian Association was reported by its president to be opposed mainly because the Plan was too costly and too big for young children. North side people set up no other organization, but they hit at the Plan in regular club meetings as well as outside.

Four presidents of north-side mothers' clubs at schools to be closed were willing to discuss the question with an interviewer during the period, January-February, 1969. There was a total of 1514 students in their schools at the time, but paid membership of the mothers' clubs was 204.[33] The presidents reported total active memberships between 50 and 90. Each president stated that the majority of her group opposed the Plan, although only one club had voted--at LeMoyne School a meeting of 65 mothers was unanimously against it.

These mothers' objections fell largely under two headings: 1) the size of the Campus Plan; and 2) the quality education component. First, they said the Plan was too expensive, involved too many children, and buses, and threatened their neighborhoods. They expressed strong loyalty to their neighborhoods. As to quality education, they did not understand the Green Report. The presidents literally thought that the computer would replace the

teacher ("machines can't teach"), that the "regular teacher" would spend only two hours a day with pupils, that classrooms would have 150 children each, and that mother's clubs would be eliminated. Old schools were a secondary consideration. Two presidents of the four seemed to think that any improvements from better programs were not needed because "we are getting along okay so why change?" Dr. Barry had recently met with them, but they were more impressed with the arguments of Commissioners Shattuck and Magnarelli who had addressed their clubs.

One lady, a board member at LeMoyne Elementary School Mothers' Club, was acknowledged by all to be a leader in their opposition. She told an interviewer she read all Campus Plan literature, even before the north side site was selected and before LeMoyne School was scheduled for closing. This lady circulated eleven copies of the Green Book and other publications to many different people. Her main objection to the Plan was precisely the content of the Green Book, and she expressed satisfaction with program and old schools as they were. The whole scheme was too big and radical. School Board members who voted for it would certainly be defeated at the next election, and so would Common Council members if there were no referendum. This north side leader

convinced many mothers and she worked closely with Mr. Shattuck.

The rumor around the City was that race underlay the strong feeling of north side parents. Two mothers' club presidents raised the point about objecting to integration in order to deny it. "At Sunday communion I pray to God people won't think I am against the Campus Plan because of integration," said one fervently. Only one president would entertain the idea there was north side opposition based upon race: "Maybe they say it's the expense but they mean it's integration."

Bellevue was the only school not on the north side to be included in the Campus Plan, and its students were to be bused the greatest distance. The Mothers' Club there, comprising about one-fourth of the potential membership, seemed not to worry about the foregoing questions but about crowded conditions in the schoolroom. Their Board voted sixteen to four in favor of the Plan.

Principals at three of the north side schools reported they personally were in favor of the Campus Plan and their teachers were predominantly of the same mind. One principal was opposed to the Plan. These officials, like other teachers and administrators about the City, were mildly critical of communications from the District about the

Plan. Communications were too little and too late. The The principals confirmed that worries about racial problems were not the major motivation underlying parent opposition, but that some such worries were present.

Support and Opposition

A run-down on the coalition process, November 1968 to January 1969, suggests that the Campus Plan had aroused moderate interest but had not activated large numbers of people or organizations in Syracuse.[34] Proponents of the Plan were headed de facto by Superintendent Barry and, to a lesser extent, Mr. Jaquith. They reportedly would be able to swing five votes on the Board of Education in behalf of a modified Campus Plan. They had no sure vote on the Common Council. It was rumored that Democrat McCarthy and one of two ladies on the Common Council, Republican Maria Farr, would vote for the Plan, while Democrat Alexander was an unknown factor.

Opposition to the Plan of course was led by two commissioners of education with both newspapers leaning generally in their direction. The key Herald-Journal editorial was that of January 14, suggesting a modified Campus Plan:

> Friends of the Campus Plan have practically killed it. In their eagerness to impose their experimental ideas on a reluctant community, they've broadcast grandiose claims that simply can't be fulfilled. We

> can't believe an experimental upheaval in the school system will, cure all of our social ills, develop each pupil's greatest potential and save the City of Syracuse from a population loss.

Thus almost summarily the newspaper disposed of an elaborate plan drawn up through many months of professional endeavor. There was no pretense that the editors had researched the Campus Plan or consulted any authorities about it. Further, it was known that Mr. Stephen Rogers the publisher of the two papers argued against the Plan in private and in the organizations of which he was a member.

Educational Channel 24 gave good coverage to the issue, including the complete public hearings in January, 1969. None of the three commercial television stations took a clear position on the plan. Newscasters on Channels Five and Nine in their comments and reporting seem to have attempted a presentation of arguments for and against. The same cannot be said for the principal local newscaster on Channel 3, recognized as one of the most constant critics of the Plan. His criticism emphasized anti-Plan viewpoints and innuendo.

One flare-up in the Board's fund-raising efforts gives added insight into the handling of the Campus Plan by Channel 3. At its October 28 meeting the Board authorized the Superintendent to begin to look for outside

financial support for the Campus Plan. With the help of ERIE, Barry recommended that a Washington firm of consultants be hired to research and advise on potential funding sources. As with the public relations firms contract, this contract (for $12,500) was to be paid from federal funds available to the District. The firm, Taft and Associates, at once prepared a "Summary of Information Pertinent to the Establishment of an Educational Park in Syracuse, N.Y." It was sent to about 68 people in the Syracuse metropolitan area whose names had been selected by Taft and Associates in consultation with Superintendent Barry, Mr. Searles of the Metropolitan Development Association, and a few other local people. Through a slip in plans, the meeting for the recipients, scheduled for December 19, was delayed until January 9. But the brochure went out and caused the president of Channel 3, Mr. E. R. Vadeboncoeur, to write President Jaquith in righteous indignation, sending copies of his letter to the newspapers. His wrath was stirred by the lengthy introduction to the brochure where psychological experiments arising out of the Eichmann trial were described. The brochure seemed to be saying that to go silently along with the "system" is often a crime. Vadeboncoeur termed this the "damnedest, most inappropriate nonsense that I can imagine being prefixed to a discussion of the Campus School Plan. If this is

the type of mentality we have working on the Campus Plan, then God help the Campus Plan."[35]

In a letter he also released to the newspapers, Mr. Jaquith replied:

> My reaction is almost identical with yours, and I agree that...reference to Eichmann did the Campus Plan no favor. [The author] does, however, have a valid point. I don't see how members of the local power structure, and especially our local legislators, can sit silently and inactive at a time when city education is so obviously falling apart...

The exchange was not mentioned again publicly, but it set the stage for the meeting of January 9, when about 40 people appeared for a morning cup of coffee and a "pitch" from Mr. Taft. The editor of the morning newspaper spoke up from the audience in surprise at Mr. Taft's estimate that national foundations would donate sufficient funds for the needed two million dollar grant for the Campus only if local sources would put up $500,000 "as evidence of community support and enthusiasm for the project."[36] In an editorial the next day he further pointed out that major fund drives for community hospitals and the symphony orchestra already were underway and complicated the Campus Plan money-raising campaign. The question lasted only a day in the press. The staff planned for money-raising to be a long-term campaign locally. But in January they and the Superintendent found no

evidence that sizeable amounts of money were going to be available from local business or foundations.

Through November, December and early January there was a good deal of discussion at meetings around the City. Most of these meetings featured debates by pro and con spokesmen. Most frequently Barry or a staff member spoke in confrontation with officers or members of the group concerned, or Shattuck debated another member of the School Board. The press reported over 40 meetings where local organizations discussed the Campus Plan after November 1. A list of organizations taking a stand in the three-month period before the hearings indicates the nature of the discussion.

Organizations Publicly Favoring the Campus Plan:[37]

Citizen's Council on Urban Renewal--a body appointed by the Mayor, voted 10-2 in favor

Downtown Churches and Synagogues for Quality Education--about 20 members who did not speak for their congregations

League of Women Voters--300 members in the metropolitan area, almost unanimously pro-Plan

Central New York Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers--about 300 members

Board of Directors, Syracuse Area Council of Churches

CAUSE (Campus Advocates for Upgrading Syracuse Education)--an ad hoc group of citizens with membership of under 30

Advisory Council to the Syracuse Office of the State Commission for Human Rights

Near East Side Inter-Church Committee

Board of Directors, United Methodist Church Metropolitan Commission

Edward Smith Elementary School PTA--unanimous approval at a meeting of 70 persons

May Memorial Unitarian Society

Democratic Action Corps--an organization of Young Democrats

Grace Episcopal Church--declared for at a meeting of about 50 members

Syracuse Unit, American Jewish Committee

Board of Directors, Syracuse Federation of Women's Clubs

Executive Board, Greater Syracuse Labor Council

Urban League of Syracuse and Onondaga County, Board of Directors

Seventeenth Ward Democrat Club

Syracuse Association of Administrators and Supervisors of the City School District

Pere-LeMoyne School Faculty--by a majority vote

Elementary Principals and Supervisors of the City School District of Syracuse--29 of 31 principals voting approved the Plan

Organizations Publicly Opposing the Plan:

Bond Information Committee-formed and disbanded in less than two months

North Side Businessmen's Association--a 250 member organization

LeMoyne School Mothers Club--unanimously anti at a meeting of 65 people

Webster School Mothers Club

Peace and Freedom Party of Syracuse

Conservative Party of Syracuse--represented by the Chairman

Far more organizations favored than opposed the Plan. These lists are not long for a city of over 200,000, and they do not represent a ground swell of public opinion. But neither do the lists above include all organizations that debated the matter and possibly not all that took positions.

A coordinator was assigned from the School District staff to organize a speakers bureau, as the CPIC had hoped. Shortly after CPIC's demise, CAUSE announced an unofficial speakers bureau under the leadership of an attorney, including a former Board member, a member of the old Campus Plan Advisory Committee of 1966-67, five university professors, the head of one Black organization, and other people. Several of these individuals spoke for the Plan at meetings over the next two months. The District organized a weekend of familiarization with the Plan for 16 selected teachers who later travelled to all 43 public schools to discuss it with faculty members. Almost every

day Barry, Salmon, and various Board members spoke in public for a Campus.

In the absence of accurate survey data, some rather crude and prosaic indicators may give a meaningful idea of the magnitude of citizen reaction to this debate. In interviews, members of the Board and of the Common Council were asked how much mail they received about the Plan. Board members received less mail than Common Council members. For example, Mr. Magnarelli reported receiving at the rate of eight or nine letters a week in the first weeks of December, while Mr. Shattuck had received a total of only "a couple of dozen" as of the first week of January, 1969. Most of their mail incidently was for the Plan (because they were the most outspoken opponents?). On the other hand, Councilman Leverton stated he had received about 150 letters (primarily anti-Plan) by the first week of December. Councilman Tormey was receiving "several letters a day" in the second week of January. Councilman Grudzinski had received little or none by the third week of December. Perhaps letter writers were attracted to individuals who spoke in public most often. The Mayor reported that he had received, "not very much mail" as of January 23. Ironically, at that time he was receiving more mail about his pending decision on a Board replacement for President Jaquith.

In interviews in late January, editors of both newspapers reported they were receiving more mail on the Campus Plan than on most questions before the community in recent years. The editor of the Post-Standard felt that the Campus should be rated an "extremely hot issue" in comparison with others of recent vintage. The editor of the Herald-Journal did not evaluate the issue so strongly, even though his paper had taken a more outspoken position on the Plan than had the morning paper.

Were there any large public meetings? Newspaper reports of 42 sessions where the Campus Plan was discussed (November 13, 1968, through January 28, 1969) indicate that there was no unusually large audience. Fifty members met at Grace Episcopal Church to discuss and vote on the Plan. Approximately 50 members were present at Charles Andrews School PTA when it supported the Plan. Seventy voted unanimous support at Edward Smith School PTA. One hundred twenty people went out on a snowy night to hear the discussion at the north side Grant Junior High School. These were the largest meetings reported.

The Decision

The Board's hearings on the Campus Plan were held at a high school auditorium, January 9 and 10.[38] The first night an estimated 200 people sat through more

than four hours of hearings. The second night 100 people were reported in the audience. The commissioners merely listened to the speakers, who talked in order of registration with the clerk. There were 35 speakers the first night and over 50 the second. Pro-speakers outnumbered anti's the first night, 26 to 6, with three somewhat uncertain. The second night there were more anti's but still they were outnumbered by the pro's. Where are the criteria by which to evaluate a performance such as this? Six councilmen were present the first night, including the President and the Majority Leader. Five councilmen were present the second night. As always under such circumstances, every argument that had been used during the preceding weeks was heard again. No significant debate or interchange took place either evening. The speakers for the Plan were somewhat better organized; the organization named CAUSE apparently had every one of its members speaking for the Plan.

The tone of public discussion changed little after the hearings, judging from media coverage and the interviews conducted in this study. Little further coalescing was apparent on the part of either opponents or proponents of the Plan. Arguments continued to be as diverse as before the hearings. Neither journal positions nor those of the newscasters on television seemed to waver

much. There simply was not going to be a change of stance before the Board vote. The predictions as to that vote remained the same as the two preceding months: that it would be pro-.

At the Board meeting on January 28, with 80 persons in the audience, the agenda moved rapidly. First, the Campus Plan was approved "as the policy for future construction of elementary school facilities..." The delays of the past seven months were indicated by the fact this was the point where the Board "adopted" the Green Report and the White Report as "guidelines." The Superintendent was "directed to ascertain the availability of additional funds..." for the Campus Plan. Finally, it was cited that the request for borrowing money was to be transmitted to the Common Council after "firm commitments for funds have been obtained from sources other than those having to do with local funds to insure that the total capital cost to be borrowed will approximate the amount required for replacement of these facilities under the City School District's previous replacement program.[39] Voting for these motions were four Republican commissioners and against were two commissioners (a Republican and a Democrat), except for the direction to search for funds, which had no opponents. Mrs. Tanner, the sixth Republican, was absent, although she was known to be for the Plan.

The meeting adjourned after an hour and 40 minutes.[40]

A story in the Herald-Journal the next day asserted that six of nine Common Councilmen would vote against the Plan or its financing if it were before them that day. Five of these anti's were Republicans and one a Democrat, Mr. Grudzinski. A Republican, Mrs. Farr, and a Democrat, Mr. McCarthy, were reported as for the Plan. Democrat Alexander was reported as undecided and mentioned as "a possible Mayoralty candidate." The Councilmen stood just about where they had stood three months before!

CAMPUS RE-PLAN

A thermometer for community interest in public issues would have shown Syracuse's basic temperature on the Campus Plan up only a degree or two after the winter's excitement and the Board's vote. There was no flurry when the Mayor appointed Dr. Louis Farchione to replace Jaquith on the Board, although some people thought a black person should have been chosen. Farchione was known to oppose the original Campus Plan. Press discussion still dealt with the cost of new elementary facilities, integration, and quality education, in that order. Costs inevitably dominated, as Albany arguments added fuel to the fire of national worry about government economy and higher taxes. The Syracuse school discussion

climaxed again in June with Superintendent Barry's announcement he would retire September 1. Whether the spring discussion and problems were a proximate cause of his resignation, they obviously contributed to his decision.

Barry may have left that January meeting where the Board tepidly approved the Plan, with the determination to pare it down. He and a few staff members held long meetings with north side parent organization leadership. At the urging of CAUSE members, there were talks with the Herald-Journal publisher about mobilizing public opinion behind a half-size Plan which would retain all features of the original program. In early February Barry directed his staff to cut the original scheme in half, but to retain the educational program features. Assistant Superintendent Salmon was placed in charge. By March, his labor negotiation duties were demanding, so it was decided he would work only on foundations, and David Sine would redesign the Campus Plan. ERIE continued to provide one professional person to help on both aspects. Assistance was provided to Barry by one employee of a Washington firm, International Software, Inc., on paring costs and seeking foundation assistance.

The spring was a busy one at the District offices, and elementary school planning was not given high priority.

The decision to cut the Plan was casually picked up by the press in March, and in April it was explained that the first of eight new campuses was being designed to hold about 2200 pupils. Five schools from the original list, four of them on the north-side, were included. Later, news of a new north-side location for the reduced school caused little commotion. Staff work continued after Barry's June announcement, and the Board read a draft report in August. On September 16 the Board received but did not make public Barry's final recommendations about the Plan. After the election (November 18) the report was revealed as in line with previous information. It asked for a "mini-campus" or "large neighborhood school," and its estimated cost would have been $7.7 million. About one-third of the pupils would be bused to the campus adjacent to a near north-side park. Dr. Barry estimated that $415,000 would be contributed by foundations to such a reduced plan.[4] The Board asked Acting Superintendent Weeks to bring in his plan for elementary schools. In December Weeks announced he would need more time and his report would be delayed until well into 1970.[42] Nevertheless, the Plan had been subdued as a campaign issue.

Seeking Help

Superintendent Barry continued to seek support for a campus of reduced size all during the spring of 1969.

He caucused with neighborhood groups, including mothers' clubs on the north side, and CAUSE. He talked with foundations, despite the disappointing report from Taft and Associates, the firm hired to examine foundation support. The consultants provided minor entre to a few foundations, but Barry sought help from prominent Syracusans in approaching Ford, Rockefeller, and others. Barry's immediate subordinates, as well as ERIE staff, contacted by telephone and mail a long list of foundations and corporations as suggested by the consultants. Barry wished to make the personal contacts, however, but he did not find the time before leaving to follow up the staff work. In November the sum of $415,000 was mentioned as available from foundations, but otherwise nothing was said about any foundation in consequence of these efforts. In late 1969 Dr. Barry was still confident that special features of the Plan would attract some foundation aid.

Barry also sought capital from the state. He visited the New York State Education Department in March and found officials there interested in some kind of special appropriation for the Syracuse scheme. When, however, Barry asked the Onondaga County legislative delegation to introduce an appropriation bill, he got nowhere. The legislators were in a hot fight with Governer Rockefeller to reduce his $6.7 billion budget, and they suggested Barry get the Education Department to introduce his bill.[43]

Finally, he traveled to Washington on a similar mission in July. He found officials at the Office of Education interested in the Plan, but he found no sure capital assistance. He returned to Syracuse, however, convinced that federal capital would be available for a reduced Campus Plan.

Barry felt a great sense of urgency about his general role. "We are at a bending time in history and must change the direction of this education before it's too late...Erosion of urban education...is constant."[44] He appealed for the public to take a hand in solving school problems. And at least once he complained publicly that there had been no "real community reaction."[45]

"Economy"

Keeping as much money as possible out of the public sector of the local economy is a consuming passion with many Syracusans. It was economy to which the evening newspaper, Commissioners Magnarelli and Shattuck, and Councilman McCarthy had appealed in urging a smaller campus (or no campus, in the case of Shattuck). In early February, 1969, the Syracuse Governmental Research Bureau, a business-supported watchdog over the local fisc, opined that financing the Plan would need a new law or possibly a constitutional amendment. The Bureau

also suggested a smaller school, similar to an 1125 pupil school recently built in suburban Dewitt.

The White Report had specified the costs of the Campus Plan in the light of the City's general fiscal situation, although neither Barry nor most Board members ever grappled publicly with the hard issues therein. Mayor Walsh was not quoted in the press on this score, but he discussed finances freely in interview. He explained the financing problem in the context of Syracuse's total fiscal situation. He stated he would support a $5 million capital investment by the City in the Campus Plan, to be matched by the state (current aid formulas would provide about 46 per cent). Thus nearly $10 million would be mobilized, and an additional $5 million might come from foundations to support computer, audio-visual, and other special equipment. One-third from each source seemed a fair package to Walsh, and Barry generally agreed. In these terms, Barry sought help from Albany, New York, and Washington.

An air of fiscal crisis stemmed from rising local and state expenditures in 1969. In Albany, the Governor insisted the state must halt at once the rate of budget increase over recent years. In February the legislature began to discuss cutbacks in education aid. Anticipating less state aid, a special budget priorities committee

recommended to the Syracuse Board of Education that it slash $1.67 million from the coming year's budget. By September, 1969, specific program cuts were identified to hold the line at about $1.5 million below original projections. All of this bolstered the case that Syracuse could not affort the Campus Plan.

While "economy" dominated the papers, there was also talk about racial conflict in the schools. At Albany, busing pupils to school caused violent debate in the legislature. In Syracuse in mid-March, the Board announced its plan for pupil-busing for the coming year. The principal private group for more emphasis on school integration, the Coalition for Quality Education, wrote to Superintendent Barry that, "people in the Black community are rapidly losing patience with the continuously chaotic conditions existing in the Syracuse schools." Among several areas of their concern, they included "the sluggish pace at which work on the Campus Plan is progressing."[46] On March 26, a new group announced its opposition to the Campus Plan. The Greater Syracuse Parents for Improved Education were known to represent a stand diametrically opposite to that of the Coalition. In their public statement, however, they mentioned costs and "that with the destruction or sale of prior neighborhood schools

there would be no possible return to neighborhood school education..."[47] The outgoing chairman of the city-county Human Rights Commission named the crisis in the educational system as the "most significant civil rights problem faced by Syracuse." He thought the City was headed for serious trouble.[48] Representatives from other localities in the United States visited Syracuse to examine its approach to integration and its Campus Plan.[49] Racial questions were smoldering here but not burning.

The Superintendent Departs

On June 6, 1969, Dr. Barry announced his resignation, effective September 1. The only negative note was his reference to "fatigue and certain aspects of frustration."[50] Virtually everyone in Syracuse was surprised by the announcement, with the exception of those close to Barry who had seen the fatigue and frustration grow recently. There were many complimentary statements and expressions of regret, including some by Board members. The only bizarre note came when several of them were quoted as saying they did not see why Barry's resignation would affect the Campus Plan.

It takes no seer to divine the reasons for Barry's departure; they are written large on the record of the months immediately preceding it. In conversation he

admitted that Campus Plan pressures were part of the reason. He was tired. He saw himself as the center of frustrating tensions in the field of education and politics more generally. One guesses that he viewed politics in Syracuse as a dismal business in 1969 and no place for a person who wanted to accomplish things. Later in the summer, the Board chose Executive Assistant Superintendent Edwin E. Weeks as Acting Superintendent while the search for a new man went on. A Republican, Mrs. Estelle DeBoer, known to be opposed to the Plan, was appointed to the Board in August. She replaced Republican Mrs. Gertrude Tanner, a supporter of the Plan, who moved to the suburbs.

1969 Elections

During the 1969 spring, Board of Education members told Dr. Barry that the Republican leadership did not want the coming fall's election campaign to center on the Campus Plan. The Mayor asked him to send the Plan to the Common Council only after the election. No doubt, Democratic leaders felt the same way although their access to the Superintendent was less powerful officially. The advice was superfluous; Barry was not inclined to focus attention via the campaign. He proposed to leave behind him in September: a) a plan cut in half; b) with enough people favoring it to make it feasible;

c) immediately after the November election. He thought things might well turn out this way.[51] It turned out that the Campus Plan was not a major issue in the campaign.

In the summer four political parties announced candidates for the mayoralty, four School Board positions,[52] and eight Common Council seats. The Campus Plan did not figure publicly in these nominations. Democratic mayoralty candidate Lee Alexander had not previously taken a stand on the Plan, nor had the Republican choice, District Attorney Frank R. Gualtieri, nor the Liberal nominee, Mrs. Karen DeCrow.[53] When the campaigning began in September, the Plan was simply on the long list of topics discussed. And the campaign was in general quiet; no scandals were revealed, no fighting broke out; only a few verbal skirmishes occurred at small public meetings.

The Democratic and Republican candidates differed on this issue in campaign speeches. Alexander's platform committee in September asked for a "modified" Campus Plan and wanted to replace 11 old elementary schools with "larger neighborhood schools." Alexander spoke of combining four schools on one site. The Republican platform opposed the Campus Plan and any version of it which would bus children out of their neighborhood. Gualtieri,

however, spoke of "perhaps consolidation of elementary schools within the framework of neighborhood school concepts" and affirmed belief in both neighborhood schools and an integrated school system. The two smaller parties took polar stands. Mrs. DeCrow spoke for the Campus Plan in its original version. The Conservative platform advocated retention of neighborhood schools and a referendum on the Campus Plan. They wanted to prohibit busing for racial balance unless parents gave written consent, prohibit compulsory sex education, make parents responsible for vandalism by their children--in all, a typical combination of planks on the Right in the 1960s.[54]

The campaign for the School Board received virtually no mention in the press that fall. The four incumbent commissioners on the Republican ticket gave the Plan no prominence in their statements but instead called for an "acceptable" long-range elementary school building program. They discussed more state aid to education, busing and integration, discipline in the schools, and replacing outmoded schools. The Liberal Party endorsed the two Republican candidates who had voted for the Campus Plan the previous January, while the Conservative Party endorsed the two Republican candidates who had been appointed to the Board by the Mayor after the vote was

taken. The latter two Commissioner-candidates made plain their opposition to the original version of the Campus Plan.

Gualtieri reported that he found in his campaigning "the vast majority of the people of this community are unalterably opposed to the Campus Plan." The day before election he said he felt his opposing the Campus Plan and cross busing had "hit a particularly responsive chord with the voters."[55] The outcome did not bear him out, however. Lee Alexander was elected Mayor, and the Democrats took a 7-3 majority on the Common Council.

The rather low turn-out and the low-key debate on education, however, produced victory for all four Republicans running for the Board of Education (See Table II). Two incumbents who voted for the Plan were returned, while the Mayor's two appointees, both anti-Plan, also won. The coincidence of a Republican Board being elected with a Democratic City government caused little comment. The close margin and perhaps a lack of real public excitement stifled speculation on the reasons for the apparent contradiction. But four regular Board members now opposed the Plan and in part the Republican Party's judgement about education was justified.

Education remained alive as a public issue for a

few days after the campaign. The morning paper advised Alexander that education was the "most urgent" question locally:

> How to replace obsolete school buildings and how to maintain the highest type of teaching within limitations of a budget which faces an automatic deficit each year because of built-in increments and a tight ceiling on city funds...
>
> The Syracuse Board of Education has kicked around the experimental Campus Plan proposal for more than three years, with the knowledge that most parent and taxpayers are unwilling to abandon the neighborhood school concept and that many of the leaders of the Negro community were opposed to cross-busing for integration and to across-city busing to a major elementary campus. (sic)[56]

At a weekly breakfast of "community leaders," sponsored by the University, there was a discussion of problems facing the Mayor. The fifty local officials and university administrators wrote Alexander that his number one problem was "schools," followed closely by housing and finances. Yet another very low point in the Campus Plan's history had been reached.

TABLE II

1967

Syracuse Election

Commissioner of Education

(Regular election for three)

Candidate	Rep.	Dem.	Conservative	Liberal	Total
Munson, Howard	29,783			1,379	31,162
Coon, Douglas	28,921			1,299	30,220
DeBoer, Estelle	27,317		2,412		29,729
Jones, Thornton		28,223		1,310	29,533
Coulter, Thomas		28,565			28,565
Maslyn, John		27,427			27,427
Malone, James			2,667		2,667
Ellis, Amon			2,277		2,277
(To fill a vacancy)					
Farchione, Louis	29,755		2,455		32,210
Mangin, William		27,777		1,251	29,028

Source: Onondaga County Board of Elections

RETROVERSION

The events described here are part of the wave of concern about the educational process that has swept over America in recent times. Racial questions have been a major component of this general questioning, but by no means is it limited to them. The Syracuse proponents of

the Campus Plan, who saw it as a broad response to many problems, were not strong enough to breast the local opposition, much less the widespread concerns it reflected. A vocal minority often finds it easy to block a community decision if it can generate a controversy. Nor does the minority have to meet technical arguments in kind. "What is said is less important than the fact there is an argument going on."[59]

The nature of the Syracuse Campus Plan may of course have been related to its defeat. It was an innovation that demanded big changes. Over a period of 20 years its completion would have required the investment of $56 million or almost exactly the unused debt capacity of the City in 1967, under the state constitutional limits. Equally great changes were proposed in curriculum teaching methods, abolition of school neighborhoods, and in other factors. It seems self-evident that Syracusans simply did not perceive that sufficient benefits would flow from such innovations in patterns of elementary education with which they were familiar.

For five years the people of this City addressed themselves to the conditions of elementary schools and schooling--physical, human, and program conditions. Furthermore, it is known that Syracusans value education and

rank it highest among the governmental services.[58] Whether because or in spite of this priority ranking, education decisions in Syracuse are not closely related to other decisions, as studies have illustrated. Participants in the educational decision-making process tend to be individuals and groups with "narrowly defined interests."[59]

The involvement of the Republican Party, the Common Council, and a number of laymen in the Campus Plan debate moves one slightly away from that finding of previous studies, however. Probably more individuals have participated in it than in any other educational decision in Syracuse's recent history. The usual patterns of behavior and modes of decision-making for education were disturbed by deep emotions common to many American localities in the late sixties. Among these emotions, virtual ideologies, were those of stringent governmental economy, neighborhood-ism, and perhaps racism.

Ideologies

Technical leadership, the professionals at District headquarters, proposed the Campus Plan of 1967. The community and its varied forces responded over the next three years, on balance, negatively. Syracuse's professional educators are probably as capable as those of

any city of comparable size. In the abstract their profession represents the store of knowledge about education. The education process, however, has yielded very slowly to modern scholarship. This point plus the vital nature of education have meant that the plans and views of professional educators have always been legitimate objects of community discussion and decision. What happened in Syracuse is happening with increasing frequency across the United States--the professionals were challenged. A small minority of citizens forced the professionals to retrench.

Complete faith in government professionals is virtually an ideology with certain liberals. The Campus blueprint of 1967 attracted most Syracusans of liberal stripe because it came from Dr. Barry and the District staff and also because it appeared to be innovative. Persons from other professions, highly educated people, reform-oriented and good government types--do-gooders all--worked for the Campus Plan. This grouping was not joined by businessmen, labor, teachers, or any other large, organized segment of the community. The supporting coalition was simply too small to have much chance of success.

Other patent ideologies were working in people's minds against the Plan. An obsession with governmental

economy was probably the prevailing motivation of politicians and many businessmen in the City by the winter of 1968-1969 when the chips were down. At that very time in New York and nation-wide there was an upsurge in worry about government spending. Syracusans have long been accustomed to the daily revival of this issue in their newspapers, in relation to every conceivable public issue. More than elsewhere in America, economic conservatism runs in the veins of central New Yorkers. The Conservative Party has its strongest toe hold here. More importantly, the Republican Party has used economic conservatism as its ideological backbone for many years. It has for example kept Syracuse on or nearly on a "pay-as-you-go" fiscal system for City government since the Depression years. It has frequently led Onondaga legislators to oppose vociferously what they feel are the big-spending policies of their own, Republican state administrations, often at the cost of their standing in the Republican Party. In 1968-70 cries for economy became more shrill than ever. Whereas the City schools had been afforded sufficient money for much innovating in the years before 1967, the cutbacks that were instituted in the winter of 1968-1969 surprised many people. It was with this sentiment, reflected especially in Albany, that the Campus Plan collided.

Neighborhood-ism or, more narrowly, the feeling that the neighborhood is the ideal unit for the elementary school, had the coloration of ideology throughout the Campus Plan dispute. Here again is a concept not unique to Syracuse,[60] one that has often been equated with racism. People differ as to the part schools may play in creating feelings of neighborliness. No doubt, however, neighborhood-ism is sometimes a genuine emotion. A parent may value having her children walk home to lunch. Or a parent may dream of his own lost childhood or a childhood never experienced. Increasing pressures on the individual in the urban milieu may produce it. As a reaction to bigger cities and crowds, to mass media and mass living, may come a retreat into the "little platoon we belong to" or would like to belong to. How "strong" neighborhoods may be in Syracuse is a subject yet to be researched, but "neighborhood" was a watchword to many parents during the entire period under study. A neighborhood orientation to schools can exist, it is suggested, and racial antipathy may be ancillary to it, on occasion.

Racism

But racism itself was a yeast working in Syracuse during the Campus Plan years. How much opposition was

based upon the Plan's declared goal of further integrating the races in elementary schools? This is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of them all. If we define racism as hatred or fear based upon skin color, it was not an explicit motivation at any time. At times appeal to "economy" seemed to be a surrogate for other worries. Superintendent Barry was quoted in January, 1969, as saying, "I think we are all so afraid of race that we don't even talk about it. Maybe this is the thing that is missing...Let's get it out on the table." But it did not get out.

In interview, several high officials stated their feelings that racism was a strong motive among voters, but no influential person would admit he himself feared black children in the schools. There were numerous accusations that both education commissioners and common councilmen were motivated by anti-black bias. Direct evidence was of course never adduced. Several ethnics in interview were very explicit, however, in claiming that ethnic voters were worried over racial questions. "Nobody's kidding us, integration is the main aim of the Campus Plan." "Our people say they will move out of the City if this happens." "Black people are beginning to oppose the Plan. They don't want their kids away from home either." The Campus Plan will destroy

everyone's neighborhood. This was a telling logic for some interviewees who claimed to report the feelings of their constituents.

It was commonly held by both blacks and whites that prominent civil rights and black organizations were staying quietly in the background to let the white leadership find an acceptable solution to racial imbalance in elementary schools. The major local pro-integration group, The Coalition on Quality Education, took positions on numerous closely related issues. They pressed a lawsuit to have the State Commissioner of Education enforce integration in Syracuse.[61] Its leaders apparently determined to stay neutral on the Campus Plan in the hope that integration might progress through it without their intervention.

Syracuse controversy was relatively mild, in contrast with other American communities in the late sixties. Any strong feelings about racial issues were camouflaged with arguments on economy, educational methods, and neighborhood schools. Segregation was the school issue all over America in the late sixties, but in Syracuse the struggle was quiet and almost unnoticed.

Political Parties

Local party organizations rarely make public decisions on individual issues like this, nor is it common to have discipline in party ranks on individual issues. The Republican Party is organized on an Onondaga County basis, and the chairman lived outside Syracuse in 1968-1970. Several important figures in the Party, however, were known to oppose the Plan in 1968--some publicly, others more discreetly. In the late fall, 1968, the chairman and one assemblyman, among others, were working against the Plan behind the scenes, via telephone, conversations, and other informal contacts.

Any signals by the Party to Republican education commissioners may or may not have played an important part in this story. Republican education commissioners in Syracuse rarely behave as if being guided by Party directives. President Jaquith recalled Party intervention directly in Board affairs on but two occasions in recent years. One was during the debate on location of a new high school, while the other was at a time when state aid was being sought to bus children through areas where traffic was hazardous. But in the present case, the public never heard of any Party stand. The Republican Chairman, in January, 1969, replied to an inquiry from Superintendent Barry that the Party leaders wanted no briefing and in effect would not support the Plan

(the Democratic Chairman wrote a similar letter). Quiet word came to the Board in the early spring, 1969, that Republican Party leaders wanted the Campus Plan to be subdued as an issue in the forthcoming election campaign. These messages apparently did not reflect any collective decision by Republican officials, however, but only the opinions of a few leaders.

Mayor Walsh told Dr. Barry the Plan should be kept out of the campaign. The Mayor took the view publicly that his party could not afford to interfere in School Board business except at elections. Nevertheless, the two commissioners he appointed to Board vacancies in 1969 both turned out to be anti-Campus Plan (appointment to a vacancy is analogous with election). The Mayor flatly stated this policy stand was not a factor in their selection. And indeed if he and high Republican officials attached importance to the Plan's defeat, they could have seen little need for alarm. The network of influence in the Party made it possible for the Plan to be vetoed at a fairly low level--the Common Council had only to threaten, not to act.

In 35 interviews with influentials on the Campus Plan decision, the authors employed the traditional "who governs?" question: "Can you name two or three people who are really going to decide what Syracuse does

about the Campus Plan?" In reply, 18 respondents or 51 per cent named Mayor William Walsh and emphasized his authoritative position in the governmental structure. Common Council members were mentioned collectively 12 times. There were scattered references to the Superintendent and School Board.

The strong relationship between a mayor's stand and a community decision has frequently been noted. "Of all the actors involved in the (local) governmental decision, the Mayor seems to have the greatest influence."[62] Reputationally, the Syracuse Mayor held the trump card in Campus Plan decision-making. "If he would run again and ask for the Campus Plan," many interviewees said, "it would carry." Mayor Walsh however did not run in 1969 for a third term, nor did he speak forcefully in behalf of the Plan. His voice might have counteracted the many small voices that spoke against the Plan. He might have dispelled controversy. Within his own party ranks, however, it is hard to see how Walsh could have won a victory for the Plan. And subsequently Mr. Gualtieri, the Republican mayoral candidate, took a position almost entirely in opposition to a campus. One concludes that the net result of Republican actions during the Campus Plan dispute was to help defeat the proposition.

As for the Democratic Party, within memory it has not been as visible or as well organized as the Republican. The Plan was discussed at a meeting in late October, 1958, where three Common Council Democrats, Commissioner Magnarelli, the Party Chairman, and one or two other persons were present. They took no position but left the decision to each individual. Magnarelli was to work out an alternative to the Campus Plan, although he had no staff (in December he did propose a 4-4-4 scheme). There was no further activity by the Democratic organization in this decision process. The most influential Democrat, Councilman-at-Large Lee Alexander, took no position until he became candidate for mayor, later in the spring. Then he supported a modified plan. In sum, Democrats neither hindered nor helped the Campus Plan.

Superintendent and Board

Community power is indeed a network of action, and the fate of the Campus Plan was determined by the interplay of actors, rewards, and goals--the uses of power. An actor's power derives from the possession or reputed possession of resources as well as from the use of those resources. Most actors in the Campus Plan decision process possessed power as a result of their legitimate roles, appointive or elective, in the governmental

apparatus. With few exceptions, actors employed their resources slowly or partially, and in that sense the decision-making apparatus turned out to be slack. In this conclusion, then, comment about the comparative roles of the Board and Superintendent, formal leaders in the educational process and thus the leading actors in behalf of the Campus Plan, are in order.

The Board acted only to support plans initiated by its Superintendent and staff, and never grasped the initiative. This was not so much a failure of will on the part of Board members favoring the Plan as it was an inability to communicate with a broad spectrum of Syracuse citizens. It was not simply lack of charisma, or unwillingness of the news media to support the Board's views, or a failure to mobilize sufficient numbers of opinion leaders, although all these reasons certainly played a part. The Board was not effective. It was only after two years that some members began to speak out for the Superintendent's plan. Working on a large project with a superintendent requires among other things candid appreciation by the Board of the limits and risks for the Superintendent. When he lacks complete protection and strong support by the Board, the Superintendent cannot work effectively.[63] The Syracuse Board seems

never to have been wholeheartedly enough for the Campus Plan to penetrate the fiscal crisis or the integration fears. In a word this comprehends what happened in Syracuse. The Board did not work hard enough at coalition-building throughout the community. The community decision-making system in Syracuse is very decentralized. On the big issues it will deny change, if there is not high consensus in the community or if the proponents of change are not willing to expend a tremendous amount of energy.[64]

As for Superintendent Barry, like many school executives, he had a solid and in part personal base of power in Syracuse in 1966. He knew he must increase it to win the Campus Plan, so he tried to build a coalition during the fall and winter of 1968-1969. Seeking support, he wrote to the chairmen of the two major parties and they refused him. He visited the publisher and editors of the two daily newspapers to ask for non-opposition as a minimum. Their editorials however called for economy and for reducing the size of the Plan. He tried to influence the same men by asking other influentials to plead the case, but they failed as well. The Superintendent spent time with the Mayor occasionally, and the Mayor consented to the Plan. The Mayor's support was strongest when the

original plan was announced. He did not, however, take to the hustings for it.

The Superintendent attempted to convince prominent lawyers and businessmen to intervene. He asked the influential Executive Vice President of the Metropolitan Development Association to campaign for the Plan, but this scheme did not succeed. He convinced the Board of Education to appoint a Citizen's Public Information Committee, but he saw it collapse. He came very close to getting the backing of organized labor, but failed again. He generally had the support of school administrators in the City, but he never gained organized teacher support. Indeed, he made no overt efforts to gain that support. The Superintendent explained such an action would have bordered on the unethical.

He did garner organizational backing for the Plan. The roster of organizations that declared for the Plan in the 1968-1969 winter may be somewhat deceptive, however. Virtually none of them went beyond verbal expressions of support. In other districts where innovations in education have been suggested, ad hoc organizations as well as perennial civic groups have made money-raising drives or have sponsored speaking and advertising campaigns. These techniques have been applied in countless

localities throughout the life of the municipal reform movement, and the public relations profession in recent years has had a chance to perfect the techniques even more. No such outside support came to the rescue of the Campus Plan, however.

The Superintendent worked hard, usually by himself, for that was his style. His instincts told him to proceed slowly with the coalition-building effort. In retrospect, he might have made it a stronger strategy by hiring a public relations aide for the District staff. He might have delegated further responsibility to one or more of his senior staff or to an ERIE professional to negotiate with foundations, to attract organizations and individuals into supportive roles, or to raise private funds. The staff was totally absorbed in running the schools, however. The Superintendent had control over federal grants from which to pay for more assistance. He used some funds to hire International Software. He kept that firm and ERIE in the wings, however, and never brought them on stage. When he tried to hire a local public relations firm, he was temporarily thwarted. They turned out a brochure, an excellent audio-slide series, and ran a telephone question-answer system in the late fall, 1968. In retrospect it seems

that major reliance for informing the public rested on the three rather formidable reports prepared for the Board of Education, and they were far from being public relations documents. The speaking campaign organized out of District headquarters in December, 1968 - January, 1969 seemed to have little effect.

The Board continued to treat the Campus Plan as Dr. Barry's plan and not as their own. Four members did expend great energy in speaking at public meetings for the Plan, in the period just before their vote in January, 1969. Otherwise they attempted little coalition-building. But that is not to suggest the treatment of the Campus Plan by the Board of Education was a deviation from their usual behavior. The Board traditionally has not mounted high-pressure campaigns to "sell" the public. Furthermore, some Republican leaders were urging, behind the scenes, that the Plan not be pushed by the Board. A Board member was being pressured in one direction by District professional aides and in another direction by party officials. Newspapers stressed governmental economy. Voting for the Plan was therefore a small act of courage by Board members. To have done more would have required considerable political fortitude.

What is a board of education supposed to do? Not long ago the life of a school commissioner may have been

leisurely and honorific, but that day has fled. They are now called on to cope with a range of questions and situations that has increased in scale and complexity. They consider the most minute personnel action or expenditure on the one hand, and they ponder a campus plan on the other. Their agenda, however, is always packed with the administrative minutiae of running schools. The trivial questions of the day leave them neither time nor energy to think of the major, largely unformulated problems of urban education. Long-range planning is inevitably neglected. Furthermore, when a board has no fiscal autonomy (as in Syracuse), the frustration may be compounded. Nevertheless, board members are unpaid, and being a commissioner is rarely a path to higher elective office!

The Syracuse Board members who voted for the Plan accepted, consciously or not, the Superintendent as the leader and themselves as supportive of his leadership. Their image of the Board was in some ways similar to the stereotype of a business corporation with its board of directors and chief executive. The Board formulated policy, largely by choosing among alternatives presented by the Superintendent, the general manager. But policy and administration are no more discrete in the schools than in other work. A better model of these inter-relationships might have been selected from the courtroom. During the period from May, 1967, to February, 1969, the Board

comprised a kind of jury before which the Superintendent had to prove the Campus Plan was the best method for handling elementary schools. Whatever the model, the net result was to leave to the appointed executive the burden of formulating policy, of selling that policy to the people, and of raising foundation money.

A pessimist might prophesy that one day Syracusans will look back on the halcyon days of the Campus Plan dispute, for it was overall a gentlemanly quarrel. The late sixties were troubled years in Syracuse; but compared with other big cities, there was not great unrest in the schools, the Black people were quite unconcerned, and there was virtually no teacher militancy. Nevertheless, it was mainly with nationwide issues that the community was grappling. And at the end of four years, there had been no visible payoff to all the discussion of the Campus Plan.

A NOTE ON PROPOSITION-BUILDING

The educational world will not be revolutionized by the finding that far-reaching and costly educational innovations are hard to adopt and implement in a city that is politically and economically conservative. When one tries to generalize from a case study, however, such conclusions

invariably emerge. And their emergence is but indirectly related to the skill of the researcher or writer.

The case against the case method is so well known as not to bear repeating here. The social sciences developed in part from an attempt to break with the emphasis on the particular. Case studies do not seem to contribute to science: by nature they are a striving toward particularity. They do produce generalities like the above, so they will be at least slightly relatable to the world of aggregates. Then, occasionally, generalities drawn from a case may become a step toward stating narrower relationships. Hopefully, these in turn may be further broken down into hypotheses that ultimately may be tested with more precise behavioral techniques.

The following statements drawn from this study illustrate the currently insuperable problem of the case study so far as scientific social science is concerned. This whole study has been written at the level of role and institution. The broad concepts it employs and the inexact language in which it speaks obviously prevent "operationalization" for more careful research purposes. For example, the only exact relationship one can assert between the superintendent and the school board generally are those displayed by the organization chart, which are indeed of little use. We have come to realize that in the American

culture the setting on one hand and the personalitities on the other are of greater significance in determining behavior and interrelationships than any kind of ascription. But let us try our hand at proposition-building from the Campus Plan story in the hope that some readers will gain further insight from the effort.

I. What is or is not a major elementary school innovation is a matter of individual and public perception. This case suggests, however, that such an innovation may be distinguished by:

A. Plans for--

1. Large-scale alteration in school boundaries;
2. Borrowing large amounts of capital;
3. Major program changes;
4. Reassignment of students on the basis of race or color.

B. Goals--

1. "A better educational product;"
2. Drastic changes in traditional methods (teacher role, teaching, curriculum, equipment use);
3. Integration of pupils of different races.

Proposition 1: The likelihood of adoption or implementation of a planned innovation varies inversely with the number of the foregoing elements it contains.

II. The reception a proposal for innovation receives will obviously depend upon the climate of opinion in the subject community. Nothing new has been contributed to understanding of this process by the present case study. What is here termed "climate of opinion" derives from the history and traditions of a locality as well as from the current environment of decision-making. The political science literature has a lot of commentary on this point.[65] On such historical and environmental factors hinge the supports for a major school innovation that may arise in a given instance. No new light has been cast by this study on the many potential varieties of support. Supports, however, potentially may come from all parts of the government and the community or from outside. One may suggest a rank order of importance for the major possible sources of support, on the basis of this case study:

1. Legitimate educational authorities--superintendent, school board, administrators, principals
2. Legitimate governmental authorities--mayor, council
3. Political party leadership
4. News media
5. Parent organizations
6. Teacher organizations
7. Other organizations

Proposition 2: The likelihood of success of a proposed innovation varies directly with the number of the foregoing elements lending support to it.

Proposition 3: A numerically small opposition to an innovation will tend to defeat supporting actors and groups who are larger in terms of numbers or power (measured in various ways).

III. Finally, only general and familiar findings about the forms or effects of opposition to racial integration measures in elementary schools have surfaced here. Among the expressed forms such opposition takes are:

1. Arguments in behalf of "neighborhoods"
2. Opposition to busing pupils
3. Arguments that old school plant is adequate
4. Arguments against any innovation in methods--team teaching, "teaching machines," computers, television.

Proposition 4: An argument for the "neighborhood" tends to be motivated by antipathy to racial integration in the schools.

Proposition 5: An argument against busing tends to be motivated by antipathy to racial integration in the schools.

FOOTNOTES

1. Max Wolff, "The Educational Park," Integrated Education (April-May 1967), pp. 1-7. See also: Max Wolff, "The Educational Park," American School and University (July 1964); Max Wolff, Esther Rothman and Leopold Berman, "The Case for Educational Parks," Architectural Record (February 1966); and John H. Fischer, "The School Park: an Assessment," Education Age (March-April 1968)

2. Max Wolff, "The Educational Park," American School and University (July 1964)

3. Syracuse Board of Education, Research Department, "A Planning Study of the School Building Needs in the Syracuse Public School System" (Syracuse: 1959)

4. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, "Process of Change, the Story of School Desegregation in Syracuse, New York," Clearing House Publication #12 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1968)

5. Comparative achievement test scores for elementary schools were examined by District staff at intervals, but they were not released until 1969.

6. Parochial school enrollment that year was 7,596 for K-6.

7. David F. Sine and Lawrence J. Marquit, "A Feasibility Study of the Campus Site Concept for Elementary School Construction in Syracuse, New York" (Syracuse: Syracuse Campus Site Planning Center, 1967). Hereafter cited as the "Orange Report." The definition of imbalance was: Negro enrollment "greater than 1.5 times or less than 0.5 times the overall city school district racial percentage pattern at its particular educational level..." pp. 72-73.

8. One of the seven Board members at that time was a Negro, Robert E. Warr, an engineer.

9. "Orange Report," pp. viii-xiii. These points are stated more elaborately in "Quality Education for Elementary Schools," May, 1968, the first supplement to the original study. This supplement will be cited hereafter as the "Green Report."

10. See various drafts of "Elementary School Sites," Research Report 9-66 (Syracuse: Syracuse School District, February 23-March 14, 1966)

11. About $6 million was reserved in the City's capital budget for elementary school construction.

12. Syracuse Post-Standard, September 26, 1966, p. 13

13. Syracuse Herald-Journal, November 29, 1966.

14. "Report on the Campus Plan Site Plan to the Board of Education" (Syracuse: May 26, 1967) Duplicated.

15. Seven of eight schools to be closed were on the north side of the City, but the first campus was to be on the southeast. This apparent contradiction caused adverse comment at once. People said the busing distances would produce more state aid for the city. School district officials said that more land was available more readily on the southeast.

    Later, City-County planning officials told the Mayor the site was not in accordance with their plans and would cause problems. The Mayor thought the planning agency should let citizen reaction subside and say nothing. Interview with N. Rotunno and W. Wasserstrom, May 2, 1969.

    Mayor Walsh in late 1969 said he had disliked and argued against the north side site. Interview, October 21, 1969.

16. See the "Orange Report," passim.

17. "ERIE is a nonprofit organization dedicated to improving the total elementary and secondary education program in the region it serves...It is one of 20 such enterprises created under Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. ERIE, "Progress and Plans" (Syracuse: 1968) Dr. Barry was a member of the Council of ERIE during 1969-70.

18. See the "Green Report."

19. Ibid., p. 2.

20. Ibid., p. 3.

21. One staffer recalls the Board session when the "Green Report" was submitted. Barry, humorously but seriously, asked the Board how long they wished to keep him studying the Plan but not acting on it.

22. C. V. Willie and M. O. Wagenfeld, "Socio-economic and Ethnic Areas in Syracuse and Onondaga County, N. Y., 1960" (Syracuse: Syracuse University, Youth Development Center, 1962) Nine of 36 census tracts on the north side were heavily Italian in 1960, and four were heavily German. Poles and Irish were concentrated on the west side of Syracuse.

23. Syracuse Herald-Journal, October 16, 1968. As a department of city government, the Board had no standing to call a referendum. Its budget is approved by the Board of Estimate and Common Council.

24. "Financial Implications of the Campus Plan--Quality Education for Elementary Schools," Second Supplement to the Report for the Syracuse Board of Education on a proposal on the Campus Plan (Syracuse: September 1968) Hereafter cited as the "White Report."

25. In interview, Dr. Osborne pointed out that no campus site had yet been picked on which he could definitely estimate costs. This and other missing details prevented him from giving better estimates than he did.

26. "The Campus Plan: One Answer to Quality Elementary Education in Syracuse" (Syracuse: Office of the Superintendent, Syracuse City School District, November 1968)

27. From July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1969, Barry had some $250,000 of U.S. Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title III, money available to use at his discretion. Over $150,000 of these funds were unspent at the end of the fiscal year.

    In the summer of 1968 senior members of his staff asked Dr. Barry to hire a PR staff man to organize the Plan drive. At the end of October 1968, ERIE volunteered to do more of the public information work.

28. Syracuse City School District, Memo from Mrs. James Costa, Secretary to CPIC, November 26, 1968.

29. The $20,000 was to come from the federal ESEA, Title III, grant to the District.

30. The county legislature has no jurisdiction over educational matters.

31. George C. Shattuck, "The Community School Concept," Syracuse Herald-Journal, November 12, 1968.

32. This Center is an ESEA, Title IV, regional educational laboratory as is ERIE in Syracuse.

33. There were no other parent groups at these schools.

34. An opinion survey of a sample of 232 blacks in the period, December 6-16 1968, found that 30.6 per cent had "heard or read about" the Plan. Robert D. Bontrager, "An Investigation of Black Press and White Press Use Patterns in the Black Inner City of Syracuse, N.Y." (Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, June 1969)

35. Syracuse Post-Standard, December 23 and December 28, 1968.

36. District staff members also were dissatisfied with the Taft organization's work. An internal memorandum made this very plain, and Assistant Superintendent Salmon wrote to the Post-Standard editor in disagreement about Taft's interpretation of the need for local financial support for the Plan.

37. After the hearings, the directors of the Greater Syracuse Chamber of Commerce endorsed the Plan with qualifications on February 12, while the Jaycees endorsed it March 15, 1969.

38. "We had twelve hearings on the south side high school," said a former commissioner of education. "Why were there only two hearings on the Campus Plan?"

39. Syracuse Board of Education, Minutes of the Special Meeting of January 28, 1969.

40. This was Mr. Jaquith's last meeting and his closing comments emphasized the futility of the referendum idea. Howard G. Munson had been elected President of the Board in December.

41. "The Campus Plan: Quality Education for Elementary Schools. A Modification to the Report to the Syracuse Board of Education on a Proposal for the Campus Plan," Syracuse Post-Standard, November 19, 1969.

(This report was prepared primarily in the offices of ERIE and underwent only slight editorial changes from August until its release.)

42. Syracuse Herald-Journal, December 23, 1969.

43. Syracuse Herald-Journal, March 27, 1969. The legislative drive for economy among other things produced the State education aid cut that cost Syracuse an estimated $1.6 million for fiscal year 1970.

44. Syracuse Post-Standard, April 4, 1969.

45. Syracuse Herald-American (Sunday newspaper), April 13, 1969.

46. Syracuse Post-Standard, March 14, 1969.

47. Syracuse Post-Standard, March 26, 1969.

48. Syracuse Post-Standard, July 29, 1969.

49. Syracuse Post-Standard, July 5, 1969; Syracuse Herald-Journal, July 9, 1969.

50. Syracuse Post-Standard, June 9, 1969.

51. Interview with Dr. Barry, June 27, 1969.

52. Two vacancies were for vacancies the Mayor had filled temporarily.

53. Commissioner Magnarelli was considered by Democrats for the Presidency of the Common Council. A few party officials from the liberal wing opposed him, in part it was said because of his stance on the Campus Plan.

54. Syracuse Post-Standard, August 29 and September 15, 1969; Syracuse Herald-Journal, September 25, 1969.

55. Syracuse Post-Standard, November 3, 1969.

56. Syracuse Post-Standard, November 6, 1969.

57. Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz and D. B. Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), p. 114.

58. H. G. Frederickson and H. Magnas, "Comparing Attitudes Toward Water Pollution in Syracuse," 4 Water Resources Research, 1968, pp. 877-889.

59. Linton C. Freeman, Patterns of Local Community Leadership (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1968), esp. chapter 4. See also R. C. Marin, et. al., Decisions in Syracuse (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1961)

60. Louise Day Hicks stood for neighborhood schools in Boston. See Robert Bediner, The Politics of Schools: A Crises in Self-Government (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), pp. 16, 60-68. President Nixon embraced neighborhoodism in early 1970, perhaps an indication that it had become a majority feeling in the United States.

61. This suit had not reached the courts by early 1970.

62. Robert L. Crain, Elihu Katz and D. B. Rosenthal, p. 114.

63. D. W. Minar, "Community Politics and School Board," The American School Board Journal, 3 (1968), p. 37. See also A. K. Campbell, "Who Governs the Schools," Saturday Review (December 21, 1968), p. 52.

64. R. L. Crain, Elihu Katz, and D. B. Rosenthal, p. 227.

65. See for example E.C. Banfield and J.Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, 1963); D. Goldrich, R.E. Agger, and B. Swanson, The Rulers and the Ruled (N.Y. 1965); and O.P. Williams and C.R. Adrian, Four Cities (Philadelphia, 1963).